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Seigniorage in the 21st Century: A study of the profits from 





This paper develops a new theory of seigniorage suited to modern economies where the ma-
jority of money is created not by the state or central bank but by commercial banks and 
other monetary financial institutions via their lending activity. We identify four different 
forms of seigniorage that take account of the modern institutional separation between the 
state, the central bank, commercial banks and the non-bank private sector in terms of their 
identities as ‘money creators’ and ‘money users’.  The new typology differentiates between 
seigniorage profits arising from interest rate spreads on stocks of created money and profits 
arising from flows of interest payments on newly created assets. We illustrate our theoretical 
framework with empirical data on commercial bank seigniorage and related variables in the 
United Kingdom and the Denmark over the past quarter century. 
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Seigniorage is the revenue earned from the issue of money. Historically, this revenue accrued 
to the “seigneur” or ruler. (Bank of Canada 2013) 
 
Historically, issuing money has been a royal prerogative, one of the reasons being that it gen-
erates considerable revenue, called seigniorage. From the sovereign's point of view this could 
be seen as equivalent to tax revenue. Today the Danmarks Nationalbank Act states that the 
Nationalbank is responsible for issuing banknotes, while minting is the prerogative of the 
Treasury under the Coinage Act. Since 1975, the Nationalbank has been in charge of the pro-
duction and administrative aspects of minting. After allocations, the seigniorage falls to the 
Treasury via the National bank’s allocation of profits. (Pedersen and Wagener 2000, 19) 
      
     In modern economies the majority of money is created by private commercial banks ra-
ther than central banks or any other state body (see for instance Ryan-Collins et al. 2011; 
Jackson and Dyson 2013; Werner 2014a; McLeay, Radia, and Thomas 2014; Jakab and 
Kumhof 2015). A survey into the history of economic ideas reveals that this is anything but a 
new insight. The process by which commercial banks create money when they issue new cred-
it was central to thinking of prominent figures of the discipline such as Knut Wicksell, Frie-
drich Hayek, Irving Fischer, John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter and was an inte-
gral aspect of theories on banking and money at the beginning of the 20th century (Turner 
2013; Werner 2014a). 
     As the 20th Century wore on, however, banks’ main role was viewed as intermediating 
between savers and borrowers and they were not granted any privileged position in main-
stream theories and models of the economy (Ingham 2004, chap. 1). The financial crisis of 
2007-08, however, made clear that bank credit and money creation was of fundamental signif-
icance to the macroeconomy. The recognition of the capacity of private commercial banks to 
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create money has profound implications for our understanding of many other concepts and 
phenomenon in the economy (Turner 2015). This includes the concept of seigniorage. 
The quote from the Bank of Canada above illustrates how seigniorage is generally understood 
as the revenue derived from the creation of new money and the introduction of this money 
into the economy. And the subsequent quote from the Danish Nationalbank illustrates how 
money creation and thus also seigniorage is typically attributed to the sovereign ruler in the 
economy, whether it be the monarch or the government represented by the central bank and 
the Treasury. The ambition of the current paper is to rethink the concept of seigniorage in 
light of the fact that today neither monarchs nor central banks but rather commercial banks 
play the primary role in the creation of money, a point brought home by the Bank of Eng-
land’s recent Quarterly Bulletin Article on the subject (McLeay, Radia, and Thomas 2014).  
This paper has two objectives. Firstly, since seigniorage has historically been a source of con-
siderable income for monarchs and governments, the shift towards commercial banks creating 
money has implications for public finances and the macroeconomy. This is one of the points 
that we wish to highlight with the current paper. A second objective is to inform and qualify 
on-going public and political debates about money and monetary reform. If we understand 
how commercial banks derive profits from seigniorage we are in a better position to discuss 
and evaluate proposals for changes to the monetary system, including potentially shifting the 
prerogative to create money back to governments and central banks (see e.g. Benes and 
Kumhof 2012; Dyson and Jackson 2013). We illustrate our examples of modern seigniorage 
by drawing on data for the UK and Denmark, both countries where lively discussion around 
monetary reform are occurring. While the paper does not directly address questions of sei-
gniorage in terms of monetary reform, it does prepare a conceptual framework for such a 
discussion. 
     The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 sets out a conceptual framework for under-
standing four different concepts of seigniorage and how this relates to epistemological consid-
erations around the nature of money. This framework informs the following sections. Section 
2 reviews different concepts and measurements of state or central bank seigniorage. This in-
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cludes particularly the distinction between monetary seigniorage and opportunity cost sei-
gniorage. Section 3 extends the logic of these concepts by applying them to the contemporary 
economy, where seigniorage is accrued by commercial banks. The section presents a definition 
and a formula for the measurement of commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage. Section 
4 applies the definition and measurement of commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage in 
an empirical analysis of seigniorage profits in United Kingdom and Denmark. Section 5 re-
turns to the theoretical discussion by exploring the concept of commercial bank monetary 
seigniorage and which is the also applied in a brief analysis of ‘excess financialization’ in 
United Kingdom and Denmark. The final section summarizes the findings of the paper. 
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1. Seigniorage and Money 
     Like money itself, seigniorage is a concept that appears straightforward at first glance but 
upon closer inspection turns out to be highly complex. In the literature, we find competing 
definitions and the field is 'marred by a certain confusion about the appropriate way to 
measure seigniorage' (Baltensperger and Jordan 1997a, 133). This confusion is not merely due 
to superficial differences in the definitions of technical concepts.  Any concept or calculation 
of seigniorage invariably implies a number of important assumptions about the nature of 
money and money creation. The lack of consensus on the definition of seigniorage is thus a 
symptom of the lack of consensus over the definition of money itself (Bjerg 2014, 148–52). As 
we review different definitions of seigniorage in the next section, we shall see how each of 
them corresponds to different theories about the nature of money. The discussion serves to 
set up a theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical analysis of our two cases, UK 
and Denmark. 
     We propose to map the assumptions behind the definition of seigniorage according to four 
questions, laid out below: 
 
A) What is money? 
     If seigniorage is revenue accrued through the creation of money, any concept of seignior-
age necessarily has to make an assumption about what money is. Which kinds of assets 
and/or liabilities do we include in our measurement of money? The vast majority of the lit-
erature on seigniorage takes for granted that the state has a monopoly on the creation of 
money and thus only include bank notes, coins and in some cases central bank reserves as the 
basis for seigniorage (see for instance Gros 1989; Klein and Neumann 1990; Rovelli 1994; 
Pedersen and Wagener 2000). However, the more recent literature on commercial bank mon-
ey creation recognizes that the majority of money in modern economies is electronic deposits 
created by commercial banks in the act of lending (McLeay, Radia, and Thomas 2014). 
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B) Who issues money? 
     Since seigniorage is accrued by the creator of money any concept of seigniorage also has 
to make an assumption about who issues money.  The question here is not simply whether 
the state or commercial banks should be included as creators of money. Even within the lit-
erature on central bank seigniorage there are differences in the way that the state as the cre-
ator of money is conceived. While some authors treat the state as one coherent issuer of 
money (see for instance Friedman 1971; Drazen 1985) others take into account the institu-
tional separation between the central bank and the government (see for instance Rovelli 
1994; Pedersen and Wagener 2000). We concur with Klein and Neumann (1990) that defini-
tions of seigniorage should pay close attention to particular institutional circumstances in 
different countries as these may have profound implications for the way that money creation 
is turned into seigniorage. This includes not only the relation between the central bank and 
the government but also the relations between commercial banks, the central bank and the 
government. 
 
C) How is money introduced into the economy? 
     The way money is created and introduced in to the economy has profound implications 
for the definition and measurement of seigniorage. If we think of new money as being spent 
directly into the economy, seigniorage profits are accrued as the difference between the cost 
of producing money and its purchasing power. If, however, we think of money as an interest-
free credit that is lent in to the economy and circulates, seigniorage is accrued in the form of 
interests foregone by the users of money. In the literature, the former kind of seigniorage is 
referred to as ‘monetary seigniorage’ and the latter as ‘opportunity cost seigniorage’ (Gros 
1989; Klein and Neumann 1990; Neumann 1992; Baltensperger and Jordan 1997a). This dis-
tinction is not only relevant in terms of the introduction of central bank money into the 
economy. It is also useful in terms of discussing how commercial banks introduce new money 
into the economy. 
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D) From whom is seigniorage revenue accrued? 
     While definitions of seigniorage are usually quite explicit about who receives the revenue 
from money creation, their assumptions about where this revenue ultimately comes from tend 
to be more implicit. The underlying economic model in most studies of central bank seignior-
age assumes that there is only one possible source of new money- the state (or its monetary 
authority). Furthermore, it is also implied that there is only one class of money users. This 
means that money creation is typically conceived as a trade-off between the state, who ap-
propriates purchasing power through an expansion of the money supply, and private money 
users (everyone else), who experience a deflation in the purchasing power of the existing 
money supply in circulation (see for instance Bruno and Fischer 1987). This trade-off may be 
partially offset by growth in the productive output of the economy, which increases the de-
mand for money and thus curbs inflation. Another version of the trade-off is that the state 
finances deficit spending through the issuance of new money, which then circulates as an 
interest free loan to the government. But in both cases, seigniorage is ultimately paid by pri-
vate users and holders of money in the form of either lost purchasing power or foregone in-
terests. 
     The inclusion of commercial banks as creators of money complicates the conception of 
seigniorage. With multiple money creators in the model, seigniorage is not just simply paid 
by private money users. Rather, we may also consider seigniorage as revenue foregone by an 
original monopolistic money creator by relinquishing its monopoly and allowing other institu-
tions to also create money. The model with only one kind of money creator and one class of 
money users is a one-dimensional model, where the only question is: what is the optimum 
amount of money the money creator should issue? In a model with two money creators, the 
question is not only how much but also who should issue money to achieve the most desirable 
economic impacts. This introduces a second kind of trade-off, which is not between money 
creator and money user but between two different money creators. Obviously, the trade-off 
between different money creators is crucial when trying to understand and evaluate the 
changing relations between the central bank and commercial banks.  
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The four questions above constitute the parameters framing any particular definition of sei-
gniorage. Table 1 combines these parameters to provide a mapping of different definitions of 
seigniorage in terms of their underlying assumptions. The rows define who issues money and 
thus accrues seigniorage. The columns define how new money is introduced into the economy 
and thus the kind of seigniorage that is derived. Inside each cell is a simple mathematical 
definition of the particular notion of seigniorage, the implied definition of money, and a de-
scription of the way that new money is introduced into the economy. The definitions listed in 
the table are not assumed to be self-explanatory. In the following sections we thus provide 
further elaboration and explanation for each of the four combinations. The table serves first 
and foremost to provide an initial overview and guide to the structure of our argument.  
 
Table 1: Definitions of Seigniorage  
 Monetary Opportunity Cost 
Central Bank S=∆M  
Money is notes and coins 
New money is spent into economy
S=Mib  
Money is base money 




S=∆ L−∆ gL−1  
Money is current account deposits
New money is spent on interest 
bearing financial assets 
S=M (imb−id)  
Money is current account deposits 
New money is lent to private bor-
rowers 
Where: 
S = seigniorage 
M = money supply 
L = non-bank liabilities held by commercial banks 
g = GDP growth rate 
ib = interest on government bonds 
imb = market benchmark interest 
id = interest on commercial bank deposits 
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2. State and Central Bank Seigniorage 
2.1 Monetary Seigniorage 
The use of metals in this rude state was attended with two very considerable inconveniencies; 
first with the trouble of weighing; and, secondly, with that of assaying them. ... Before the in-
stitution of coined money, however, unless they went through this tedious and difficult opera-
tion, people must always have been liable to the grossest frauds and impositions, ... To prevent 
such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all sorts of industry and com-
merce, it has been found necessary, in all countries that have made any considerable advances 
towards improvement, to affix a public stamp upon certain quantities of such particular met-
als, as were in those countries commonly made use of to purchase goods. Hence the origin of 
coined money, and of those public offices called mints. (Smith 1776, 27) 
 
     In Adam Smith's classic account money emerges as a convenient solution to the problem 
of exchange in a barter economy. We find this in his famous story of the butcher, the brewer, 
and the baker, who make the transition into a money economy by employing metals as a 
medium of exchange in their mutual transaction. Along similar lines Smith explains how the 
institution of minting also emerges as a practical solution to certain inconveniences. In the 
account, quoted above, seigniorage is the value added to gold or silver bullion as it is 
stamped and minted into standardized coins. It is, in other words, the value incurred as a 
commodity is transformed into money. This account fits into the notion of money found in 
the so-called commodity or metallist theory of money (Menger 1892; Goodhart 1998, 2)  
Even if we no longer make money out of precious metal, which carry a commodity value par-
allel to their value as money, the commodity theory of money is still pervasive among many 
economists. Much of contemporary orthodox economics relies on an idea that 'money's his-
torical origins and logical conditions of existence are explained as the outcome of economic 
exchange in the market that evolves as a result of individual utility maximization' (Ingham 
2004, 19). This means that the existence of money in the market is taken for granted and it 
may be treated as nothing but a 'veil' over an economy, that essentially functions as if it 
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were based on pure barter (Schumpeter 1954, 277). As stated by one of the key proponents of 
neo-classical economics, Nobel memorial laureate Paul Samuelson 
[E]ven in the most advanced industrial economies, if we strip exchange down to its barest es-
sential and peel off the obscuring layer of money, we find that trade between individuals or 
nations largely boils down to barter. (Samuelson 1973, 55) 
      
     Even if money is not actually a commodity but paper printed by the central bank or just 
records on an electronic ledger, we can still treat it intellectually as if it were a commodity. 
This view is illustrated by the following comment from Paul Krugman: 
Here’s my current thought: in some sense money is a really weird thing, which can look to in-
dividuals like a real asset — cold, hard, cash — but is ultimately, as Paul Samuelson put it, a 
“social contrivance” whose value is more or less conjured out of thin air. Mainstream macroe-
conomics acknowledges the weirdness — in particular, makes heavy reliance on the ability of 
central banks to create more fiat money at will — but otherwise treats money a lot like ordi-
nary goods. (Krugman 2015) 
 
     The monetarism of Milton Friedman is a classic reference point in the literature on sei-
gniorage, which is based on the commodity theory of money. In a seminal paper on the issue, 
Friedman begins with the following statement: 
It has become common to regard inflation produced by the issue of fiat money as a tax on 
cash balances. (Friedman 1971, 846) 
 
     Money may be a useful technology to facilitate the exchange of goods and services in the 
market but the creation of fiat money by the government also has the potential to disturb 
the inherent mechanisms in the economy that push the market towards equilibrium. Fried-
man builds on Fischer's classic equation of exchange: 
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MV=PT         (1) 
where: 
M = stock of circulating money 
V = velocity of money 
P = general price level 
T = volume of transactions.  
     V is presumed to be constant in the long-run meaning that the amount of money chang-
ing hands to pay for transactions is equal to the value of these transactions. Adjustments to 
the money supply, which is assumed to be exogenous, should thus feed directly through to 
prices and income. Thus M is the independent variable in the equation above which the gov-
ernment or central bank controls.   
     Friedman argued that any issuance of government money in excess of economic growth 
leads to inflation, which devalues the purchasing power of existing money balances. Seignior-
age is thus conceived as an alternative form of taxation. It is an ‘inflation tax’ through which 
the government may finance investments or fiscal deficits. Rather than imposing convention-
al forms of taxation, which appropriates a portion of the existing money in circulation, the 
government finances itself by permitting its monetary authority (in most cases the central 
bank) to issue new money. Besides Friedman himself we find this view in a series of other 
works (Fischer 1982; Buiter 1985; Mankiw 1987a; Calvo and Leiderman 1992; Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin 1992)  
     A simple mathematical definition of this kind of seigniorage, which is discussed in 
Groeneveld and Visser (1997, 72) is: 
S=∆M        (2)  
where: 
∆M = change in the supply of central bank money. 
     This definition may be refined to take into account the actual costs of producing money 
and the impact of inflation on the purchasing power of the new money issued by the central 
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bank. In some versions, M measures only central bank notes and coins and in other versions 
it also includes central bank reserves.  
The crucial issue raised by the strand of literature viewing seigniorage as a form of inflation 
tax is the question of identifying the optimal point in the trade-off between inflation, growth 
and seigniorage (Mankiw 1987b). How much (or perhaps rather: how little) money should the 
central bank issue in order to balance its interests in supporting the government on the one 
hand and ensuring economic stability and growth on the other.  
     In the underlying model of the economy we find two classes of agents: the money creator 
and the money users. On the creator side, no distinction is made between the government 
and the central bank, and on the user side, no distinction is made between firms, banks and 
private individuals. Just like Marx would conceive of profits as part of a class struggle be-
tween capitalists and workers, the concept of inflation tax conceives of seigniorage as part of 
a class struggle between government and the market as constituted by the collective of pri-
vate money users.  
     This notion carries with it an undertone of seigniorage as an illegitimate and potentially 
abusive form of exploitation of money users, which can be found not only in much of the 
orthodox literature on seigniorage but also in policy making in terms of the institutional 
structures and operations of contemporary central banks. Indeed the institutionalisation of 
central banks that are fully independent of governments and focussed primarily on inflation 
targeting above and beyond other objectives and the prohibition of monetary financing of 
governments by central banks in most advanced economies can be seen as an outcome of this 
conception of seigniorage as a primarily negative inflation tax. In his paper on seigniorage, 
Friedman is remarkable clear on his position on the issue: 
My own personal view is that inflation is neither desirable nor necessary, that the most effec-
tive road to development is through free enterprise and private investment, and that the gov-
ernment can serve best by limiting itself to essential government functions, keeping taxes of all 
kinds low, refraining from intervention into the economy, and providing a stable monetary 
framework. (Friedman 1971, 847) 
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2.2 Opportunity Cost Seigniorage 
[S]eigniorage [is] the 'interest-bearing debt' which the government does not have to issue due to 
the operation of monetary policy. (Rovelli 1994, 13) 
     A common critique of the above approach of monetary seigniorage is that it does not take 
into account the institutional division between the central bank and the government treasury 
(Pedersen and Wagener 2000). If we accept the arguments that central banks can be and are 
independent, then the government is not at liberty to just 'print new money' at will in order 
to finance deficit spending. In most cases today, central banks are operationally independent 
from governments, with a specific mandate to secure specific monetary policy goals such as 
financial stability and steady low inflation. Financing the government, in particular long-
term financing or financing at rates superior to market rates, is typically prohibited.  In ad-
dition, the creation and the spending of money is institutionally separated between the cen-
tral bank and the ministry of finance (Ryan-Collins et al. 2011, 77–92)  
     When taking this separation fully into account, money is no longer conceived in terms of 
the commodity theory but rather in terms of the so-called state theory of money. This theory 
conceives of money as ultimately a creation of the sovereign state through its legal powers to 
institute and enforce legal tender laws as well as taxation (Knapp 1905; Bjerg 2014, 100–
104). According to this theory, money is a special form of credit with the state or debt owed 
by the state, depending on the perspective from which it is perceived. This debt is special 
because it is not redeemable in other forms of money. It can also be used for payment of tax-
es or other forms of debt to the state. Furthermore, the state may require banks by law to 
hold a certain quantity of monetary units as reserves. All of these features place central bank 
base money at the top of a hierarchy of credits and makes it the most liquid means of ex-
change in the economy (Bell 2001). Due to this special character of central bank base money, 
people and banks either voluntarily or for legal reasons hold this credit with the state at no 
or at least at below market rates of interest. 
     Thinking in terms of monetary seigniorage and the commodity theory, seigniorage is the 
difference between the commodity price of money and the nominal price of money that is 
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between the production cost and the face value of money. Thinking in terms of opportunity 
cost seigniorage and the state theory of money, seigniorage is the difference between the 
market interest rates on debt and the interest on the special kind of debt owed by the state, 
which is also money. Under this conception money is central bank base money consisting of a 
combination of physical notes and coins as well as commercial bank deposits with the central 
bank. While notes and coins are available private money users, deposits with the central 
bank can only be used in transactions between commercial banks or between commercial 
banks and the central bank.  
     The simplest mathematical definition of central bank opportunity cost seigniorage is de-
rived from Groeneveld and Visser (1997, 73): 
S=iM        (3) 
where: 
iM = interest foregone by the holders of money. 
     This definition assumes that no interests are paid on commercial bank deposits with the 
central bank and that physical cash is produced at no cost. Taking these two features into 
account, central bank opportunity cost may be defined as in (4). This definition is derived 
from Groeneveld and Visser (1997, 73) although it has been slightly changed to take into 
account the cost of producing physical currency:   
S=iBN −C+(i−ibr)BR      (4) 
where: 
BN = notes and coins 
C = costs of producing physical cash. 
BR= central bank reserves 
i = interest foregone by commercial banks holding reserves 
ibr = interests paid on reserves to commercial banks. 
     Perhaps the most elaborate definition of central bank opportunity cost seigniorage is pro-
vided by Rovelli in his investigation of the relation between seigniorage and reserve require-
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ments in the European Union. While the definition above takes the perspective of money 
users, Rovelli (1994, 22) takes the perspective of the central bank: 
S=ί φΦ−1+ic B−1C +i L L−1C −i RR−1−CS    (5) 
where: 
ίφΦ-1 = interests earned on foreign assets 
icBC-1 = interests earned on claims to the government 
iLLC-1 = interests earned on loans to banks and other institutions 
iRR-1 = interests paid on commercial bank reserves with the central bank 
CS = costs attributable to the issue department of the central bank. 
     Rather than viewing seigniorage as revenue forgone by holders of cash and central bank 
deposits, Rovelli calculates the revenue actually earned by the central bank through the issu-
ance of money. In the former definition, seigniorage is measured as a discount on the financ-
ing of the liability side of the central bank balance sheet. In Rovelli's definition, seigniorage is 
derived from the holding of assets on the central bank balance sheet enabled by the creation 
of money. As mentioned, the purpose of the current paper is not the settlement of divergent 
definitions of central bank seigniorage. The point here is thus merely to show how seigniorage 
may be conceived in terms of the issuance of non- or low-interest bearing debt by the state in 
the form of the central bank. 
     As implied by Rovelli's definition, the central bank introduces new money into the econ-
omy as it increases its holdings of assets in the form of government bonds, loans to banks 
and other institutions or foreign assets. These assets are typically purchased from commercial 
banks in return for a credit on their deposit accounts with the central bank or a transfer of 
physical currency. It is important to note how the central bank depends on the commercial 
banks to translate an increase in central bank deposits into an increase in commercial bank 
deposits, which may be used by private money users. Even in the case of physical currency, 
the central bank has no outlet to distribute these directly to private money users but have to 
rely on the ATM's of commercial banks. 
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     A curious exception to this rule is the fact that employees with the central bank (at least 
in the case of Denmark and the UK) have private accounts with corresponding payment 
cards directly in the central bank. The Bank of England even features an ATM in its lobby 
exclusively for employees. As the central bank pays salaries directly into these accounts it 
does in fact spend money directly into the economy thus realizing a kind of monetary sei-
gniorage. 
2.3 Central Bank Independence 
     Besides the commercial banks, the treasury constitutes another interface between the 
central bank and private money users. The treasury and the central bank interacts through 
two main channels: direct transfer of seigniorage and purchase of government bonds. The 
ownership structure of central banks vary between countries with different compositions of 
government ownership, ownership by banks, and private shareholder ownership (Rossouw 
2014). But part of the institution of a central bank is typically some kind of obligation to 
transfer seigniorage to the treasury. This money is credited to the treasury's deposit account 
with the central bank. As new money is now available for government spending, we may 
think of this as a form of monetary seigniorage (For empirical studies of this kind of seignior-
age see Gros 1989; Hochreiter, Rovelli, and Winckler 1996; Hochreiter and Rovelli 1999) 
     A significant portion of the central bank's portfolio of assets is constituted by government 
bonds. If the central bank purchases these bonds directly from the government, it also pays 
by crediting the treasury's deposit account in the central bank, thus making new money 
available for public spending. This is the second main channel for the interaction between the 
central bank and the treasury. Since the central bank lends this money to the government, 
we can argue that this is merely a form of opportunity cost seigniorage. If, however, we re-
gard the central bank as a public institution that is an integrated part of the state, we may 
think of the debts and credits between the treasury and the central bank as merely a matter 
of internal book-keeping, whereby money accrued through the selling of government bonds to 
the central bank could be counted as monetary seigniorage. 
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     The role of the central bank as a public institution and the institutional separation be-
tween government and central bank is a delicate issue. While this has probably always been 
the case as long as central banks have existed, it has become especially pronounced with the 
establishment of the EMU and subsequently the Euro. Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty in-
scribes the separation between the central bank and government into the constitution of the 
EU: 
Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with 
the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in 
favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local 
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of 
Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European 
Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments. (European Union 2007, para. 123) 
      
     This article from the Lisbon Treaty means that states cannot circumvent the separation 
between government and central bank by letting the central bank purchase government 
bonds directly from the government with newly created money. Any purchase of government 
bonds must be done indirectly, that is on secondary bond markets, and it should be governed 
by general monetary policies such as financial stability or hitting an inflation target rather 
than a fiscal policy concern for the financing of government spending. The Treaty thus im-
plies a consolidation of the separation between fiscal and monetary policy within the EU. 
Fiscal policy is the responsibility of government while monetary policy is the responsibility of 
the ECB as well as national central banks in the EU. 
     Article 123 thus creates a separation between the powers to create money and the powers 
to spend money. National governments may spend money into the economy by purchasing 
labour power and commodities or simply give the money into the economy through various 
kinds of social benefits to citizens. They can, however, only finance themselves through taxa-
tion or borrowing of money already in existence. The power to create new money lies with 
the central bank and the national governments have no access to this power. They may re-
ceive transfers of money as dividends of the seigniorage revenues of the central bank but this 
should be regarded as a 'convenient fringe benefit' (Rovelli 1994, 15) of the core operations of 
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the central bank, which are spelled out in the monetary policy targets of low inflation and 
financial stability. 
     The institutional relationship between the central bank and the government is also im-
portant to consider when we review central bank opportunity cost seigniorage in terms of the 
fourth in our list of questions: From whom is seigniorage revenue accrued? As we have seen, 
Friedman's notion of inflation tax suggests that seigniorage revenue is ultimately accrued 
from the holders and users of money, whose purchasing power is deflated as new money is 
created. Rovelli's definition of seigniorage as 'the 'interest-bearing debt' which the govern-
ment does not have to issue due to the operation of monetary policy' seems to have similar 
implications. The interests saved by the government through the issuance of money is paid 
by money users, as they are forced to hold this debt of the government without getting paid 
any interests. 
     As already indicated in the theoretical discussion, the conception of seigniorage may 
branch off into two directions at this point. The notion that seigniorage as interest forgone 
by money users assumes that if the government cannot finance itself through the central 
bank, it will have to borrow existing money at interest from money users instead.  This mod-
el, however, abstracts from the role of commercial banks in the economy. The crucial ques-
tion is this: When governments are barred from utilizing the money creating powers of the 
central bank, does this mean that less seigniorage is accrued from the money users, or does it 
mean that other institutions will de facto take over and meet the public as well as private 
demand for additional money and thus also take over the power to accrue seigniorage? In the 
following, we argue that the latter, rather than the former, seems to be the case. 
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3. Commercial Bank Opportunity Cost Seigniorage 
3.1 Money as Commercial Bank Credit 
Total seigniorage is the sum of bank seigniorage and central bank seigniorage. Central bank 
seigniorage consists of the revenue due to the currency demand and the revenue due to the 
possibility to force the banking sector to hold reserves. Bank seigniorage is the net revenue due 
to the desire of the private sector to hold deposits which pay less interest than bonds. (Balten-
sperger and Jordan 1997b, 786) 
 
     If we look at financial transactions in volume terms, electronic commercial bank credit 
money would appear much more economically significant than physical notes and coins 
printed and minted by the central bank. This is corroborated by statistical measures, which 
show that in Denmark only 5 percent of the money supply is constituted by notes and coins 
whereas 95 percent is commercial bank current account deposits. The equivalent figures for 
the United Kingdom are 3 percent and 97 percent (Ryan-Collins et al. 2011).  
     These proportional relations between central bank cash money and commercial bank 
credit money are also reflected in contemporary debates around the theoretical conception of 
money. Arguing against conventional textbook economics, which suggest that banks are 
merely financial intermediaries, several authors have suggested that commercial banks play a 
much more prominent role in modern economies as they are the primary creators of money. 
These authors include post-Keynesian endogenous money theorists  (see for instance Moore 
1983; Lavoie 1984; Cottrell 1994) as well as a new wave of authors showing this conception of 
money to be not only theoretically (Werner 2005; Ryan-Collins et al. 2011; Jackson and Dy-
son 2013; Huber 2014) but also empirically (Werner 2014a; McLeay, Radia, and Thomas 
2014) inaccurate and misleading. 
     The conception of money applied by these authors is derived from the so-called credit 
theory of money (Innes 1914; Bjerg 2014, 115–31). Money is debt issued by individuals or 
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institutions, which enjoy general credibility or creditworthiness in the economy. Given this 
general creditworthiness their debt circulates as a general means of payment and settlement 
throughout the economy. In our contemporary economy, the primary creators of money are 
thus commercial banks, who administer the deposit accounts that are used to pay and receive 
money, when money users make electronic transfers. Even the government accepts this kind 
of money in payment of taxes thus supporting its general acceptance among money users. 
The role of commercial banks in the creation of money obviously has profound implications 
for the appropriation and distribution of seigniorage in the economy. If commercial banks are 
the main suppliers of money they should also be the main recipients of seigniorage. 
3.2 Commercial Bank Seigniorage 
     In the quote at the beginning of the section, Baltensperger and Jordan conceive of sei-
gniorage as consisting of two components: central bank seigniorage and commercial bank 
seigniorage. Building on the work of VanHoose (Vanhoose 1985; VanHoose 1988), Balten-
sperger and Jordan break down the private sector's demand for money into two components: 
the demand for central bank currency and the demand for commercial bank deposits. The 
trade-off between the two forms of seigniorage is determined by the relation between the two 
forms of demand that are inversely correlated. The distribution between the two forms of 
demand is dependent on the degree of competition in the banking industry and the state of 
the payment transaction technology. 
     If there is an increase in competition in the banking system, banks may have to pay more 
interest to attract sufficient deposits to maintain adequate liquidity and/or offer loans at 
lower rates of interest. In both cases, commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage will be 
less. On the other hand, if there is an improvement in payments transaction technology, for 
example a more efficient interbank settlement system or more efficient systems for digital 
payments, this is likely to mean banks will need to hold less reserves to settle their payments 
without running into liquidity problems, meaning they can enhance their opportunity cost 
seigniorage by paying less interest to the central bank (Ryan-Collins et al. 2011, chap. 4).  
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     Furthermore, some or all of the seigniorage accrued by the commercial banking industry 
may be reclaimed by the central bank through the imposition of legal reserve requirements 
that go beyond what commercial banks actually require to participate in the payments sys-
tem. Thus, Baltensperger and Jordan define commercial bank seigniorage as opportunity cost 
seigniorage determined by the trade-off between the central bank and commercial banks: 
The banking industry can extract a larger share of total seigniorage, the lower competition and 
reserve requirements and the better the payment transaction technology. As long as some sei-
gniorage is going to the banking sector, the central bank can increase its seigniorage revenue 
without increasing the welfare loss or letting the economy drift further away from the optimal 
quantity of money. /.../ Since bank seigniorage has, from a public finance point of view, no 
direct utility for the public, it is optimal for the central bank to reduce bank seigniorage as 
much as possible. We therefore conclude that bank seigniorage should be completely eliminated 
in order to reduce welfare losses and to get closer to the optimal quantity of money. (Balten-
sperger and Jordan 1997b, 793) 
 
     The creation of money by commercial banks of course involves two parties. In order to 
create new money the bank must interact with a money user, who is willing to accept the 
debt of the bank in return for taking out a loan with the bank. Since the bank runs a risk by 
issuing a new loan, the depositor/borrower must be perceived as creditworthy for the trans-
action to be sensible from a business perspective. Typically, a bank will charge interest on 
the loan to cover this risk and often also ask for collateral for instance in the form of real 
estate.  
     At the same time, a bank must also attract deposits in order to manage the liability side 
of its balance sheet and its liquidity, since there is a high chance that borrowers will spend 
their newly acquired deposits at a different bank. It is for this reason that banks frequently 
also offer a rate of interest on deposits held with them. At the heart of the traditional com-
mercial banks' business model is the interest differential between the rate on loans issued and 
the rate paid on deposits. 
     This profit margin between loans and deposits is derived from two elements, which con-
stitute the two fundamental functions of commercial banks today: financial intermediation 
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and money creation. On the one hand, banks make profits by evaluating prospective borrow-
ers and by taking on the risk of providing them with a loan.  In the classical model of banks 
as financial intermediaries, the loan is funded by persuading savers to lend their money to 
the bank at an interest rate that is lower than that which the bank charges borrowers. This 
is the interest rate spread. On the other hand, the banking sector as a whole has a near mo-
nopoly on the store of value function of money as well as on the medium of exchange value 
through the processing of payments.  
     In our contemporary banking and money system the boundaries between lenders and 
money users has become blurred. If money users want to store their value in money or make 
electronic payments they are compelled to essentially lend their money to the bank. The 
same blurriness thus also applies to the boundaries between financial intermediation and 
money creation. The conceptual challenge in calculating commercial bank seigniorage lies in 
separating these two functions. 
     A basic mathematical definition of commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage may be 
expressed as follows: 
S=M (imb−i d)       (6) 
where: 
M = Commercial bank deposits 
id = interests paid on deposits 
imb =market benchmark interest. 
     The reasoning behind the definition is that since deposits function as money, money users 
are prepared to accept a relatively lower interest on them. Keynes (2007) refers to this as a 
'liquidity premium'. The logic of the definition is similar to the one found in discussions on 
conventional central bank seigniorage, where people are prepared to hold physical currency 
even though they do not receive any interest on this money. Commercial bank opportunity 
cost seigniorage is the difference between this interest (if any) actually paid on deposits and a 
market benchmark interest, which is the interest that the bank would have had to pay if de-
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posits were not simultaneously liquid money. The crude definition raises a number of issues, 
which need to be considered before it is applicable to empirical measurement. 
     The most elaborate empirical study of commercial bank seigniorage has been done by 
Huber and Robertson. Huber and Robertson estimated commercial bank seigniorage in 
1998/99 to be $37.3bn in the USA, €57.9bn in the Euro Area, £21.4bn in the UK, DM29.7bn 
in Germany and ¥1,846bn in Japan (Huber and Robertson 2000, 89). These calculations are 
based on a variety of the formula in equation (6). As their benchmark interest rate, Huber 
and Robertson use the base rate offered by the central bank in each of the currency zones in 
question. Furthermore, the interests foregone by having to hold some non-interest bearing 
central bank money is subtracted from the commercial bank seigniorage. In a more recent 
study, Huber estimates the commercial bank seigniorage in Germany to be €23bn in 2007 
and €17bn in 2011 (Huber 2014, 90–91). These estimates use a similar methodology although 
they are based on money market interest rates as benchmark.  
3.3 Benchmark interest rates 
     The first issue to merit discussion is the choice of an interest rate to serve as the market 
benchmark interest rate. This choice partially depends on our theoretical perspective. As we 
have seen in the discussion on central bank seigniorage, there are differences in the literature 
in terms of whether we conceive of seigniorage as actual profits accrued through a bank's 
holding of assets funded by its creation of liabilities that function as money, or whether we 
conceive of seigniorage as potential revenues foregone by money users by holding the liabili-
ties of banks at no or low interest.  
     In the context of central banks, definition (4) derived from Visser and Groeneveld repre-
sents the latter perspective, while definition (5) from Rovelli represents the former. The prob-
lem with using Rovelli's approach to commercial banks is that it would not distinguish be-
tween profits earned by financial intermediation and profits earned by money creation. This 
is why we decide to take the more conservative approach of only looking at the liability side 
of the commercial banks' balance sheets. 
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     In the approach by Huber and Robertson (2000) and Huber (2014) referenced above, the 
central bank base rate and the money market interest rate are used as the benchmark against 
which actual interests paid on deposits is compared. We believe, however, that this bench-
mark is too conservative. This is especially the case in the current situation, where central 
bank base rates are close to, and occasionally even below, the zero lower bound. First, the 
commercial bank's access to the central bank discount window is part of their special privi-
lege as money creators. Using the central bank base rate as benchmark is to make the follow-
ing implicit assumption: If commercial banks were not able to fund their liabilities through 
deposits they would have to borrow reserves from the central bank instead. But the reason 
why commercial banks have access to the central bank discount window in the first place, is 
because they administer the payment system and the creation of money. This argument also 
applies to money market interest rates. The price of money in interbank money markets is 
dependent on fact that commercial banks have access to the central bank discount window. 
Second, we should also consider the causal relation between central bank interest rates and 
the money supply. Conventional theory would suggest that the money supply is a function of 
central bank interest rates. If the central bank lowers interest rates, more investments be-
come profitable, more money is borrowed, and the supply of money expands.   
     If we adopt the idea that commercial banks create money more or less independently of 
the supply of central bank reserves (a development that certainly seems to characterise this 
relationship in the post-financial crisis period), however, we might consider whether causality 
runs in the other direction. If bank balance sheets expand at a faster rate than economic  
growth and incomes, growing volumes of debt may eventually begin to dampen consumption 
spending, profits and demand and inflation and make households and firms vulnerable to 
moderate increases in interest rates – a so called ‘debt-deflation’ (Fisher 1933). In order to 
fulfil their mandate of maintaining nominal demand and prices and securing financial stabil-
ity, central banks may have to lower interest rates and keep them low.  This may especially 
be the case of bank lending mainly flows in to existing real estate assets rather than to busi-
nesses, as the former form of credit appears weakly or negatively related to economic growth 
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(Bezemer, Zhang, and Grydaki 2016). This is of course a very big question that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The only conclusion, which we need to draw here, is that central bank 
base rates or even money market interest rates are not a useful benchmark for seigniorage. 
Instead we turn to the bond markets. 
     If commercial banks were not able to fund themselves through the creation of deposit 
money, they would be in a position similar to regular non-banking corporations with regards 
to funding (Werner 2014b; Hodgson unpublished). If deposits did not circulate as money they 
would be comparable to a kind of corporate bonds. As a market benchmark interest rate we 
thus use some kind of bond rate. But which kind of bonds should we use? Government bonds 
are backed by the government's prerogative to tax. Corporate bonds are backed by the ma-
chinery, buildings, goodwill and other forms of productive capital of the corporation. Real 
estate bonds are backed by real estate. Bonds issued by a bank, however, are ultimately 
backed by the loans that the bank holds as assets. Some of these loans will be lent against 
collateral, while others are non-secured. In addition, banks hold a number of other assets 
such as shares and government bonds on their balance sheet. This suggests that we should 
use some kind of average bond rate as the benchmark against which we measure the interests 
foregone by users and holders of deposit money.  
     This interest rate may, however, be too conservative as it fails to take into account the 
full benefit of being a bank with the capacity to create money. Paradoxically, the main asset 
of banks is on the liability side of their balance sheet, since this is where we find their capaci-
ty to create money. This poses an additional challenge to our measurement of seigniorage. 
Not only should we compare the interests actually paid on deposits with the interests that 
would have to be paid if the bank were to finance its lending through the issuance of bonds. 
We should even imagine that these bonds were issued by a bank, which did not have the 
capacity to create money. 
     A bank without the capacity to create deposit money is essentially the same as a peer-to-
peer lending company (Hodgson unpublished). It receives funding from savers and investors, 
who commit a certain amount of money for a certain amount of time for a certain rate of 
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interest, and it lends this money to entrepreneurs, companies and other agents in need of 
funding. The difference between the peer-to-peer lending company and the bank is that the 
lending company cannot expand its balance sheet at will in order to accommodate potential 
borrowers. It needs to find savers, who are willing to relinquish disposal of their money for a 
period of time, before it is able to make new loans. The issuance of a loan is thus two sepa-
rate transactions. Only the commitment of funds by savers expands the balance sheet of the 
lending company. When funds are lent out it is merely a transformation of one form of asset, 
money, to another form of asset, the loan. Depending on the business model of the peer-to-
peer lending company, lenders bear all or some of the risk of loans defaulting. 
     Since the bank, stripped of its privilege to create money, is similar to a peer-to-peer lend-
ing company, we might use the lending rates offered by such companies as market bench-
mark rates. This rate, however, might be too high as actually existing peer-to-peer lending 
companies today operate in a lending market, where they compete with banks. It may thus 
be argued that at least part of their portfolio of borrowers have been through a selection pro-
cess, where they have been found unqualified for a loan with a conventional bank. Indeed, 
UK banks have been obliged by regulation to pass on risky borrowers to peer-to-peer lenders. 
Part of the difference between the interest rate on deposits with a commercial bank and the 
interest rate on savings with a peer-to-peer lending company may thus be due to a difference 
in the risk profile of their lending portfolio.  
     Our definition of commercial bank seigniorage is formalized as following: 
S lb=D(i ab−id )
S ub=D(i ppl−id )       (7) 
where: 
Slb = Commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage lower bound 
Sub = Commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage upper bound 
D = Commercial bank deposits 
id = interests paid on deposits 
iab =average bond interest rate 
ippl =peer-to-peer lending rate. 
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3.4 Competition and Deposit Rates 
     It is in fact a simplification to say that the conventional literature on central bank sei-
gniorage does not take into account the creation of money by commercial banks. In Fried-
man's seminal paper on inflation tax, the creation of deposit money is taken into considera-
tion but immediately discarded on the assumption that competition between banks elimi-
nates seigniorage profits due to low or no interests on deposits (1971, 846n) As noted by Bal-
tensperger and Jordan (1997b, 782) subsequent authors such as Romer (1985), Brock (1989), 
and Daniels and VanHoose (1996) adopt this assumption and thus ignore commercial bank 
seigniorage on the basis that it is eliminated by competition in the banking sector. Balten-
sperger and Jordan themselves are in disagreement with these authors and thus proceed on 
the assumption of imperfect competition in the banking sector. 
     Whether or not there is perfect competition in the commercial banking sector is beyond 
the scope of this paper to determine. Our focus, in turn, is on another dimension of the ques-
tion of competition: On the one hand, money users have to decide if they want to hold their 
deposits with commercial bank A or commercial bank B. It is this kind of competition be-
tween the two banks that Friedman is talking about. On the other hand, money users have 
to decide whether they want to hold their money as deposits with a commercial bank or as 
physical cash issued by a central bank. In this sense, there is competition between the com-
mercial bank money and central bank money. It is this form of competition, which is the 
main focus of the current paper. 
     If we look at the empirical constitution of our current money and payment system, it 
seems fair to suggest that there is little and perhaps declining competition between commer-
cial bank money and central bank money. Whilst certain categories of money users, such as 
small businesses, who cannot afford card payments, or more illicit trades, may wish to avoid 
electronic money, for the majority of money users electronic money is much more convenient. 
Thus although usage of cash is not declining per se, it has declined significantly as a propor-
tion of the total money supply. As central banks do not, currently, offer money users the 
opportunity to keep deposits with the central bank they are effectively giving commercial 
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banks the monopoly to create and offer electronic money. In the near future, we might indeed 
see central banks offering digital cash to ordinary money users, which would change the dy-
namics of the way that seigniorage is accrued (Barrdear and Kumhof 2016; Buiter 2016; 
Skingsley 2016; Tolle 2016). 
     In our calculation of commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage, we shall be using 
actual deposit rates paid on the bank's outstanding account money without making any as-
sumptions about whether these are the result of perfect or imperfect competition in the bank-
ing sector. The reasoning is that even if these rates were the subject of perfect competition, 
the difference between deposit rates and benchmark market interest rates still constitutes 
seigniorage earned through the commercial bank's privilege to create electronic money. 
Whether this seigniorage revenue simply represents the bank's costs of administering the 
payment system plus a 'fair' profit determined by the competition in the sector, is also be-
yond the scope of this paper. 
3.5 Reserve Requirements 
     The fact that commercial banks are in a position to create new deposit account money as 
they issue new loans does not mean that they operate completely independently from the 
creation of central bank money. Commercial banks need to hold a certain amount of central 
bank money in the form of central bank reserves as well as physical cash money. Commercial 
bank's demand for central bank money is a function of several factors. They need physical 
cash to service customers demanding deposits paid out in notes and coins. They need central 
bank reserves to clear balances with other banks, which cannot be cleared through the inter-
bank money market. And they may also need a certain amount of central bank reserves to 
meet legal reserve requirements. 
     As noted by Rovelli (1994), Baltensperger and Jordan (1997b), Huber (2014, 90) and 
several other authors, the amount of central bank money required for commercial banks to 
operate smoothly constitute a means for the central bank to reclaim some of the seigniorage 
accrued by commercial banks through the issuance of deposit account money. This is related 
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to the fourth question posed in our introduction. Seen from the perspective of commercial 
banks, central bank seigniorage derived from central bank money held by commercial banks 
in the form or reserves or cash constitutes seigniorage forgone by the commercial bank. When 
commercial bank's demand for central bank money is lowered, for instance by the implemen-
tation of electronic payment infrastructure or by relaxation of legal reserve requirements, the 
commercial bank's share of total seigniorage revenue is increased. In other words, the trade-
off between the two creators of money is shifted to the benefit of the commercial banks. 
     In order to account for this trade-off, we include the commercial bank's holding of central 
bank money in the definition of commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage.  If the bank 
did not have to tie up a portion of its assets in central bank money, it could have invested it 
in interest bearing assets such as bonds. We thus subtract the interest foregone by commer-
cial banks as they hold an amount of central bank money on their balance sheets.  
     But just like commercial banks sometimes pay interests on customer deposits, commercial 
bank's may also sometimes receive interests on their reserves held with the central bank. The 
policies of central banks in different countries differ on this issue, with some central banks 
paying interest on all or a portion of commercial bank deposits with the bank and other pay-
ing no interest on this money (Goodfriend 2005; Bowman, Gagnon, and Leahy 2010). In some 
countries this rate is currently even negative.  
     In fact the financial crisis led to a change in policy in several central banks most notably 
the US Federal Reserve, which introduced for the first time interest payments on commercial 
bank reserves in 2008 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008). Such inter-
est payments mean that the opportunity cost of holding central bank money instead of other 
interest bearing assets is decreased and seigniorage is again shifted back to the commercial 
bank. Including the net opportunity costs of holding central bank money we thus arrive at 




S lb=D(i ab−id )−(BR+BN ) iab+BRibr
S ub=D(i ppl−id )−(BR+BN ) i ppl+BRibr     (8) 
where: 
Slb = Commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage lower bound 
Sub = Commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage upper bound 
D = Commercial bank deposits 
BR= central bank reserves 
BN = notes and coins held by commercial banks 
id = interests paid on deposits 
iab =average bond interest rate 
ippl =peer-to-peer lending rate 
ibr = interests received on central bank reserves. 
     The first term on the right hand side of the equation is the original opportunity costs of 
holding commercial bank deposit money for money users, the second term represents the op-
portunity costs for commercial banks of holding central bank reserves and cash, and the final 
term are the interests received on central bank reserves. 
3.6 Compound Interest 
     As we have discussed extensively in the previous sections, seigniorage is revenues accrued 
through the creation of new money. We should, however, also turn this question around and 
ask: Is new money created, when seigniorage is accrued? Seigniorage constitutes a form of 
profit to the central bank, the commercial bank or whatever institution creates new money. 
But what kind of money does this profit constitute. This question is relevant to consider as 
we want to calculate how seigniorage revenues are carried over from one time period to the 
next. Let's say a bank makes DKK100m in seigniorage in a year. Does this mean that 
DKK100m new money is created? If this is the case, we need to include this new money into 
the subsequent supply of money from which subsequent seigniorage revenues are derived. We 
may refer to this as a form of 'compound seigniorage', which is not accrued on the basis of 
newly created money but rather on the basis of previously accrued seigniorage. In order to 
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take this element of seigniorage into account we would need to include compound interests in 
our calculation of seigniorage. 
     As we have seen, the nature of seigniorage not only depends on who creates new money 
but also how this new money is introduced into the economy. A similar issue arises with re-
gards to seigniorage from seigniorage. When commercial banks create new deposit money in 
the process of issuing new loans, they accrue opportunity cost seigniorage. This form of sei-
gniorage constitutes a discount on the interest that the bank has to pay to depositors. Over 
time the bank thus saves money that it would have otherwise had to pay to depositors in 
interest. Now the curious question arises: What happens to the money that is not paid out to 
depositors? This question may also be posed from the perspective of the money users, who 
are the ones paying for seigniorage: If depositors were paid the full market interest rate on 
deposits, what would they have done with the money? 
     There are principally two different options depending on the way that interests on credits 
and debts between banks and money users are recorded. If we assume that money users 
would have used the interests now forgone through seigniorage to pay down their debt to the 
bank, commercial bank opportunity cost functions to create new debt. In other words, sei-
gniorage revenue is retained on the asset side of the bank balance sheet, and banks earn in-
terests on it in subsequent years. If, on the other hand, we assume that money users would 
have kept the interests now forgone through seigniorage on their deposit accounts, commer-
cial bank opportunity cost functions to destroy money. In other words, seigniorage revenue is 
retained on the liability side of the bank balance sheet, where it functions to lower the 
amount owed by the bank to its depositors and thus also lower the amount of interests that 
the bank has to pay to depositors over time. In either case, seigniorage earned in one year 
continues to either earn interests on the asset side or save interests on the liability side in 
subsequent years. 
     In equation (8), we use current deposit account liabilities as the basis for the calculation 
of seigniorage. Since seigniorage earnings from previous years are either recorded on the asset 
side of the bank balance sheet or result in a relative reduction of the liabilities of the bank, 
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this definition does not include compound seigniorage, that is current seigniorage earned on 
the basis of previous seigniorage. In order to take compound seigniorage into account we re-
vise the definition to take into account current interests saved due to interests saved in pre-
vious years. For simplicity we assume that all previous seigniorage revenues are retained as 
reductions in bank liabilities rather than increases in bank assets. This revision amounts to 
the following definition: 
S lb=D(i ab−id )+S T−1(i ab−id )−(BR+BN )i ab+BRibr
S ub=D (i ppl−id )+ST−1(i ppl−i d)−(BR+BN ) i ppl+BRibr      (9) 
where: 
ST-1 = Corresponding seigniorage earned in the previous year 
     When applying this definition in empirical estimates it is of course necessary to choose a 
base year, where the calculation begins. In our examples, this is simply driven by data avail-
ability, being 1990 in the UK and 1991 in Denmark. 
     The conceptual as well as the mathematical definition of derivative seigniorage makes a 
number of assumptions, which are not entirely in line with the actual functioning of banks. 
Most importantly it assumes that all seigniorage revenues are retained on a bank's balance 
sheet in the form of reduced deposits corresponding to an increase in equity. In practice, 
however, banks are likely to use these earnings in a number of other ways. They may be used 
to increase salaries or bonuses to bank employees and managers. They may be used to pur-
chase non-interest earning assets such as buildings and inventory. Or they may be paid out 
as dividends to shareholders. 
     On the one hand, we may say that such uses remove money from the banks’ balance 
sheet so that they no longer continue to earn compound interest. But on the other hand, we 
may claim that even when seigniorage revenue is used in any of these three ways, they still 
remain on the balance sheets of the banking sector in aggregate in so far as bank employees, 
bank managers, property developers, office supply companies, and bank shareholders all hold 
accounts with commercial banks. This means that when seigniorage revenue is recirculated 
back into the economy of money users, it becomes the source of new money creation. This 
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creation of money is not based on the issuance of new loans and thus the creation of new 
interest bearing assets but rather on the liquidation of bank equity. When a bank, for in-
stance, pays out dividends to a shareholder, who holds a deposit account with the bank, it 
simply increases this deposit account and decreases its equity with an equivalent amount. In 
brief, equity is liquidated into money. The question is if we are justified in maintaining that 
even when new money is created through the payment of wages, expenditure on buildings 
and inventory, or the payment of dividends, it is still the source of compound interest earn-
ing opportunity cost seigniorage. Another option would be to say that it constitutes an im-
mediate valorisation in the form of monetary seigniorage, which is not carried over into the 
future (see Huber 2014, 89 for a discussion on this issue). 
     As the discussion reveals, the concept of retained seigniorage earning compound interest 
is not unproblematic. In our calculations, we therefore only include this calculation as a sup-
plement to the more conservative estimate of simple opportunity cost seigniorage. At the 
same time, the issue of compound interest and seigniorage is still important to include in our 
conceptual thinking about the way that seigniorage works over time. 
     In order to complete the explanation of all four concepts presented in table 1 in the in-
troduction, we still need to account for the concept of commercial bank monetary seignior-
age. As we shall see, this concept is a little more speculative than the other three concepts. 
Therefore, we have moved the discussion of this concept to section 6. Instead, we now move 




4.  Commercial Bank Opportunity Cost 
Seigniorage in the UK and Denmark 
     In this section we apply our theoretical model of commercial bank opportunity cost sei-
gniorage – as laid out in the previous equations- to two countries: the United Kingdom and 
Denmark. We begin by examining the variables used for the calculation. 
4.1 Measures of money 
     We choose to examine current account sight deposits as our measure of commercial bank 
money for the UK and Denmark. An alternative would have been to use a broader measure 
that might include some kinds of liquid time deposits. There is, however, no clear monetary 
aggregate appropriate for both countries for any extended amount of time that is suitable. 
Figures 1 and 2 present the development in current account sight deposits held at private 
banks as well as Central Bank reserves for the UK and Denmark. 
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Figure 1: UK: Current account sight deposits held at private banks and central bank reserves
 
Source: Bank of England codes LPQVWYE (levels) and LPQVWXS (changes): “Quarterly levels/changes of mon-
etary financial institutions' sterling and all foreign currency M1 (UK estimate of EMU aggregate) liabilities to 
private and public sectors (in sterling millions) not seasonally adjusted.” Levels were break adjusted back from 
2016 using the using the changes measure. Quarterly data was aggregated by taking average across the four quar-
ters. 
 
Figure 2: Denmark: Current account Deposits held at private banks and Central Bank Reserves 
 
Source: Danish Statistics database www.statistikbanken.dk, table DNM1KOR, DNMNOGL and DNSNB1. Cur-
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     For both countries we see little evidence of a relationship between central bank reserves 
and commercial bank deposits. This supports the existing critique of the ‘money multiplier’ 
model, which says that the model is wrong in assuming the supply of commercial bank depos-
its to be a function of the supply of central bank reserves (Werner 2005).  
     For both countries there was also a steady growth in current account deposits before the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2007. The growth was particularly dramatic during the years 
immediately preceding the crisis. While the growth in current account deposits continued in 
Denmark, interrupted only by a single year fall in 2011, it stagnated in the UK after the cri-
sis, as can be seen in the period between 2007 and 2010. Since 2012 there has been a 38% 
increase in current account deposits in the UK compared with a 24% increase in Denmark.  
The large rise in central bank reserves in the UK post-crisis is mainly explained by the Bank 
of England’s Quantitative Easing program (QE). The rise in the amount of Central Bank 
reserves in Denmark might be explained by imported effects of the QE/Asset Purchasing 
Program (APP) by the ECB, due to the currency peg of the Danish Krone. 
4.2 Interest rates 
     Figure 3 below shows that the central bank overnight rates for the UK and Denmark 
follows a similar path and that both are now at an all-time historically low level. The Danish 
rate has been at a lower level than the UK rate since 1993, except during the financial crisis 
in 2008 and 2009. The Bank of England base rate has persisted at 0.5% for 8 years, which is 
significantly below the long term average rate of 7%. Before 2008 the Bank of England base 








Figure 3: Central bank overnight rates in the UK and Denmark (end of year rate)
 
Source: Danish Statistics database www.statistikbanken.dk, table MPK3. 
 
     Figures 4 and 5 below show the key interest rates used in our seigniorage calculations for 
the two countries on separate graphs over the last quarter decade. We compare central bank 
rates with interest rates on commercial bank sight deposits and our chosen lower and upper 
bound benchmark interest rates.  
     We see how the spread between deposits held with commercial banks and the central 
bank is larger (2% as compared to 2.5-3%) in the UK than Denmark on average up to the 
financial crisis but then narrows sharply in both countries. With regard to Denmark, it is 
worth noting that the central bank now has moved its deposit rate below zero with commer-
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Figure 4: UK key interest rates (annual averages)
 
Source: Bank of England, Standard and Poor’s Corporate Bond Indexes 
 
Figure 5: Denmark key interest rates (annual averages) 
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     For the UK (figure 4) Standard & Poor’s Corporate Bond Indexes AAA corporate bond 
rate are chosen as the lower bound, reflecting the fact that if the banks did not have the abil-
ity to create money, they would need to fund themselves on the bond market like a normal 
company. For the upper bound we use S&P’s BBB corporate bond rate index, since this is 
the worst investment grade rating and a bank would struggle to operate at a credit rating 
below that. 
     Although rates on these bonds have reduced since the crisis, the reduction has not been 
anywhere near as dramatic as the base rate or the deposit rate. During the last twenty years 
the top rates for AAA and BBB corporate bonds have been 6% and 8% respectively with the 
financial crisis leading to a reduction in the rate to 2.3% and 3.5% respectively in 2016. 
For the lower and upper bound calculations in Denmark (figure 5) we have chosen to use the 
average mortgage bond rate for calculating the lower bound opportunity-cost seigniorage. 
This is sourced from the Danish Statistics database and is the rate on ‘Unit mortgage bonds’ 
that consists of a weighted average of Danish mortgage bonds. Both the corporate bond mar-
ket and the peer-to-peer lending market are undeveloped in Denmark, so the upper bound is 
more difficult to estimate. Hence we only calculate the upper bound for the latest year using 
a peer-to-peer lending rate.   
     In Denmark the mortgage bond rate fell more or less consistently until 2006 where they 
climbed until 2009. Since then they have been falling all the way towards zero. The spreads 
between the different rates are generally lower than in the UK.  
4.3 Results 
     The estimates of commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage for the UK and Denmark 
are presented in figures 6 and 7. For the UK, the calculations go back to 1998 as the S&P 
index was only available from this year.  For Denmark, only the more conservative lower 
bound estimate is available given the lack of an equivalent data set to the S&P index.  
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     For the UK the average lower bound seigniorage for the period 1997–2016 was £17.6bn, 
peaking in 2007 at £30.6bn. The average upper bound seigniorage for the same period was 
£29bn peaking in 2009 at £65.2bn.  
     For Denmark we see that the lower bound opportunity cost seigniorage averages DKK 11.7bn per year 
during the period from 1991 to 2015. It peaked at DKK 16.2bn in 1994 and has been steadily declining 
since then. In 2015 the opportunity-cost seigniorage is estimated at DKK 8.0bn  
 
Figure 6: Commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage in the UK, 1997-2016 
 



























     Due to the lack of available data it is only possible to calculate the upper bound seignior-
age for the current year for Denmark. Using a peer-to-peer lending interest rate from the 
biggest peer-to-peer lending company, Lendino, at 7.7% we estimate the upper bound oppor-
tunity cost seigniorage at DKK 49.5bn in 2016. Even though this might be an overestima-
tion, it provides a clear picture of the competitive advantage that banks hold compared to 
peer-to-peer lenders under the current monetary framework in Denmark.  
 
Table 2: Overview 


































4.4 Discussion of results 
     Commercial bank opportunity-cost seigniorage is a product of interest spreads between 
the benchmark rate and the rate on current account deposits (shown in figure 8) as well as 
the development in the amount of current account deposits. All else being equal lower 
spreads between the current account deposit rate and the benchmark rate leads to less bene-
fit being derived from opportunity-cost seigniorage. A higher volume of current account de-
posits, an increase in the central bank base rate and a large change in central bank deposits, 




Figure 8: Spread between lower bound benchmark rates and current account deposit rates in Denmark 
and the UK 
 
Source: Danish statistics database, table MPK3 and Bank of England 
 
     For both of our case study countries the effect on the total opportunity cost seigniorage 
of the increase in the amount of current account deposits over time (figures 1 & 2) can be 
seen to have been counter-balanced by the fall in interest rate spreads (figure 8). In compari-
son to Denmark where interest spreads have been falling during the whole period, they re-
mained fairly stable until 2008 in the UK when there was a precipitous crash followed by a 
slow recovery. This can explain why we see some stability in the value of opportunity-cost 
seigniorage to the banking sector in the UK before the crisis in 2008 and a fall in Denmark 
during the same time period.    
     Opportunity cost seigniorage can be viewed through different lenses. Relative to GDP 
opportunity-cost seigniorage for Denmark was 0.2% in 2015 and 0.7 % on average during the 
period 1991-2015. Similar figures for the UK are higher as they constitute 1% of GDP (taking 
an average of the upper and lower bound results) across the period but going as high as 3% 











     But we can also conceive of seigniorage relative to the earnings of the banking sector it-
self. Seigniorage constitutes a component of the total profits of commercial banks although 
the distinction between profits from seigniorage and profits from other banking activities is 
theoretical and not specified in commercial banks’ financial statements.  
     Examining the average costs and profits of banks in both countries we find that oppor-
tunity cost seigniorage constitutes 84% of the average profits of the Danish banks (Danish 
Statistics, Table MPK39) that is 11bn of 13,3 bn DDK between 1991-2014. The relationship 
to bank profitability is also striking for the UK where the average opportunity cost seignior-
age between 2004-14 represents 167% of post-tax banking sector profits (Table B3.2 from 
Bank of England). Clearly the banking sector business models of both countries are heavily 
dependent on opportunity cost seigniorage profits.   
     Seignorage is generally lower when interest rates are lower, when interest spreads are low, 
and when the gain for the banks of holding reserves at the central bank is low or even nega-
tive. In this regard it is important to note how the estimate of opportunity cost seigniorage is 
based on the conventional idea that the central bank controls monetary policy via the setting 
of interest rates. This implies that interest rates are exogenous to the private banks’ business 
model.  
     As discussed in earlier sections, this assumption can be criticized since commercial banks 
do not immediately need central bank money in order to create new deposits. They require 
liquidity. But this does not necessarily mean a requirement to secure additional central bank 
reserves from the central bank or customer deposits, since liquidity can also be created by 
interbank loans that is by the private banks themselves.   
     It has been argued that central bank interest rates are the effects rather than the cause of 
commercial bank credit creation (Werner 2005; Wray 2012). If we accept this argument, it 
seems that commercial bank credit creation has pushed the economy to the limit thus ex-
hausting the potential for opportunity cost seigniorage. When market interest rates are close 
to zero, the opportunity costs paid by money users, as they accept deposits at a low interest 
rate, also become very low. At the same time, the creation of credit and money by commer-
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cial banks has been feeding a large increase in the level of private money user’s indebtedness. 
This makes it difficult for central banks to raise interest rates without endangering financial 
stability as well as the prospects for growth.  
     The falling rates of opportunity cost seigniorage thus seem to signify an erosion of the 
classic business model of commercial banking, where profits are earned on the spread between 
deposits and loans. In a sense, this constitutes a financial version of Marx’s old prediction of 
‘the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’. This pushes banks to look for other ways to profit 
on their power to create credit and money for example through fees from securitization activ-
ities or currency and bond market trading (Bindseil, Domnick, and Zeuner 2015; Krall 2015). 
While these are ultimately derived from the power to create money, such profits are not cap-
tured by our calculation of opportunity cost seigniorage. In the following section, we shall 
turn to the final concept of seigniorage, which is an attempt to capture more unconventional 
ways of profiting from the power to create money.   
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5. Commercial Bank Monetary Seigniorage and 
Excess Financialization 
Financialization is the major dynamic polarizing today’s economies. Its aim is to appropriate 
the means of production and rent-extracting privileges for a creditor class to load labor, indus-
try, agriculture and governments down with debt. Employment, wages and capital investment 
cannot recover as long as the resulting debt overhead is left in place. (Hudson 2015, 275) 
 
     As we have seen, the nature of central bank seigniorage depends on the institutional rela-
tion between the central bank and the government. The concept of monetary seigniorage 
assumes that the government has the power to spend newly created central bank money into 
the economy. The concept of opportunity cost seigniorage, however, assumes an institutional 
separation between the central bank and the government, which means that newly created 
central bank money are lent rather than spent into the economy. In more general terms, the 
concept of monetary seigniorage assumes an identity between money creator and money user 
whereas the concept of opportunity cost seigniorage assumes a division between money crea-
tor and money user. 
     A similar kind of reasoning seems to apply to commercial bank seigniorage. The commer-
cial bank typically creates new money by lending them into the economy, where they are 
then made available for spending by private money users. The money creator is not a money 
user and we thus conceive of commercial bank seigniorage in terms of opportunity cost sei-
gniorage. The question is now whether the roles of money creator and money user are neces-
sarily divided in the case of commercial bank seigniorage? In terms of the conceptual frame-
work set-up in table 1, this issue boils down to the following: How is monetary commercial 
bank seigniorage possible? 
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5.1 Excess Monetization 
     Again it is useful to take our starting point in the existing literature on central bank sei-
gniorage. Gros provides an elaborate account of the difference between opportunity cost sei-
gniorage and monetary seigniorage in terms of a stock and a flow concept of money:   
Seigniorage [opportunity cost] is the revenue the government obtains because the public holds 
zero interest-bearing debt in the form of cash and because the government can force commer-
cial banks to hold reserves at zero interest or below market interest rates. The savings in in-
terest payments on the stock of currency in circulation and required reserves can, from an 
economic point of view, be considered the implicit revenue from seigniorage. Another way to 
look at seigniorage [monetary] is to consider the command over real resources the government 
obtains by issuing additional currency or by being able to impose higher reserve requirements. 
According to this flow concept, the revenue from seigniorage is equal to the change in the 
monetary base (non-interest-bearing component). (Gros 1989, iii our additions in squared 
brackets) 
 
     If a government is in a position to dispose over the money creating capacities of a central 
bank, it has the opportunity to expand its 'command over real resources' by simply purchas-
ing them with newly created money. As long as we think of commercial bank seigniorage in 
terms of the creation of new credit money, which is lent into the economy, they do not seem 
to have the same opportunity. It is, however, possible to deconstruct the distinction between 
spending and lending by thinking of the interaction between commercial banks and borrowers 
in terms of a process, where the bank purchases debt in exchange for newly created credit 
money. From this perspective, the commercial bank does in fact spend new money into the 
economy by purchasing assets in the form of interest bearing debt. But how does this trans-
late into a flow concept of seigniorage? The money used to purchase the debt is still a liabil-
ity on the balance sheet of the commercial bank, which may even incur some kind of interest 
itself.     
     The usual concern with governments and central banks creating too much money, which 
is reflected in Friedman's concept of inflation tax as well as Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
is that an increase in the supply of money will ultimately lead to inflation and thus a dimin-
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ishing purchasing power of the existing money in circulation. In order to conceptualize this 
concern within the framework of the contemporary institutional separation of the government 
from the central bank, Rovelli coins the phrase 'excess monetization', which is defined as an: 
[i]ncrease of the net liabilities of the government with the central bank, in excess of the amount 
which is required to keep the ratio of those liabilities to GDP constant. (Rovelli 1994, 39) 
 
     This concept accepts the premise that central banks must hold government bonds as part 
of their portfolio of assets required to conduct monetary policy.  Still, Rovelli argues, any 
increase of the amount of government bonds on the central bank balance sheet in excess of 
the demands for an expansion of the money supply, which is in turn assumed to be a linear 
function of GDP, constitutes a transfer of seigniorage to the government. Excess monetiza-
tion thus constitutes one of the components of total central bank seigniorage and it is math-




     (10) 
          where: 
BC = government liabilities held by the central bank 
n = real GDP growth 
π = inflation 
Y = nominal GDP  
     The definition basically says that we would normally expect the central bank to monetize 
government debt at the same rate as nominal GDP growth. Any surplus monetization above 
this rate is considered to be excessive. 
5.2 Excess Financialization 
     As the power to create new money has now largely been transferred to private commer-
cial banks, we find some commentators expressing a similar concern that these institutions 
will use this power to expand their 'command over real resources' at the expense of ordinary 
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money users. One of the most vocal expressions of this concern is found in Hudson's notion of 
financialization, which was quoted at the beginning of the section (see also Epstein 2001). 
The debt overhead created by the commercial banking system means that funds that could 
be used for producing investment and consumption are appropriated in the form of interest 
payments to the financial sector.   
     In Friedman, Rovelli, the Lisbon Treaty and much of the conventional literature on sei-
gniorage, all money users in the economy are treated equally as it is assumed that any infla-
tion caused by excessive money creation hits all sectors of the economy in the same way. 
This is in line with the way that central banks use an average CPI as the target of their 
monetary policy. The only money user that stands out is the government in so far as it is 
being privileged by the central bank. However, as we have seen, an empirically realistic mod-
el of the economy would separate out money users (non-bank private sector and government) 
and money creators (banks).  
     We can operationalize this alternative division following Rovelli’s notion of excess mone-
tization. Rovelli makes the assumption that under normal circumstances the central bank's 
holdings of government liabilities should increase only at the rate of nominal GDP growth. A 
similar assumption could be made with regards to the banking sectors holdings of the debt of 
all other sectors of the economy. Under normal circumstances this debt should increase only 
at the rate of nominal GDP growth. Paraphrasing Rovelli, we may thus define a concept of 
'excess financialization' as an:  
increase of the net liabilities of the non-banking sector with the banking sector, in excess of the 
amount which is required to keep the ratio of those liabilities to GDP constant. 
 




     (11) 
where: 
LCo= government and non-bank liabilities held by commercial banks. 
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     Of course the number derived from such a calculation does not constitute a net seignior-
age profit for the banking sector. It is an expression of the expansion or contraction of the 
asset base from which the banking sector is able to derive profits. And seen from the perspec-
tive of money users it is an expression of the overall indebtedness of the non-banking sectors 
of the economy. Commercial bank monetary seigniorage is thus a function of this number.  
     In contrast to the calculation of opportunity cost seigniorage, we have now shifted our 
focus to the asset side of the commercial bank balance sheet. As we make this shift it does 
indeed become more difficult to distinguish unequivocally between commercial bank profits 
derived from money creation and commercial bank profits derived from financial intermedia-
tion.  
     The extent to which banks are able to convert expanding balance sheets into a flow of 
profits depends on multiple other factors such as interest rates, asset price inflation or defla-
tion, defaults, government subsidies, their ability to charge fees for creating and selling finan-
cial assets, the role of securitisation etc. It is outside the scope of this paper to attempt to 
analyse this data but this should not distract us from the basic point. The extent to which 
commercial banks are able to expand the asset side of their balance sheet through the crea-
tion of credit money beyond the growth of the economy can be considered a measure of ex-
cess monetization and a measure of their capacity to extract resources from the real economy. 
We summarize the continuity between our concept of commercial bank monetary seigniorage 
and the discussion on seigniorage by paraphrasing the previous quote from Gros:  
Another way to look at seigniorage is to consider the command over real resources the finan-
cial sector obtains by issuing additional credit or by being able to impose higher rates of rent 
and collateral. According to this flow concept, the revenue from seigniorage depends on the 
change in the total debt (interest-bearing and collateralized). 
5.3 Estimating Excess Financialization 
     Figures 10 and 11 show the excess financialization estimated from equation (11) for 
Denmark and the UK. The figures show how much the money supply increased in excess of 
nominal GDP growth during particular years. We see that especially during the years imme-
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diately leading up to the financial crisis, the banks created money in excess of GDPgrowth. 
In 2007 and 2008 the excess monetization in Denmark amounted to 0.36 % of GDP and dur-
ing the whole period 2001 – 2008 there was a total excess monetization of 0.12 % of GDP. 
This excess monetization mainly reflects a very large mortgage credit to GDP ratio. It consti-
tutes a significant potential for accruing seigniorage for the private banks if interest rates 
were to rise, depending on the proportion of mortgage holders with fixed or variable rate 
mortgages. 
 
Figure 10: UK excess monetization by commercial banks (% in excess of nominal GDP) 
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Figure 11: Denmark - excess monetization by commercial banks (% in excess of nominal GDP) 
 
Source: Danish statistics, table Tabel: DNBAL4 
 
     In the UK, excess monetization is smaller, averaging around 0.05% since 1990, although 
again increasing in the run up to the financial crisis. Post-crisis there was a large deleverag-
ing in 2010 and 2011 and on-going negative excess monetization, potentially acting as a drag 
on the economy. Although there is an argument to saying that a significant deleveraging was 
required in the financial and mortgage lending sectors, non-financial business lending also 













     In this paper we have set out a new conceptual framework for understanding seigniorage 
in modern economies, where commercial banks are the primary creators of money. We have 
established four different forms of seigniorage:  
     1) Monetary central bank seigniorage, whereby the state and central bank are subsumed 
together and are able to spend newly created money directly into the economy, resulting in 
profits deriving from the direct new purchasing power gained and potential ‘inflation tax’ for 
all other money users. Such a concept of seigniorage, with its roots in the commodity theory 
of money, has less relevance today given the separation of the state from the central bank 
and prohibition on monetary financing by the central bank in the EU and other advanced 
economies.   
     2) Opportunity cost central bank seigniorage, which recognises the independence of the 
central bank from the state and Treasury and represents the profits the central bank gener-
ates from the fact that commercial banks and non-bank money users must hold a proportion 
of low or zero interest central bank assets as opposed to assets yielding income at market 
interest rates. 
     3) Commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage, which recognises that in modern econ-
omies the vast majority of money is created as the liabilities of commercial banks as they 
create credit for the non-bank private sector as well as the government. Commercial bank 
opportunity cost seigniorage can be calculated as the difference between the interest money 
users pay on their deposits and a market benchmark interest rate that is a proxy of the in-
terest the bank would have had to pay, if deposits were not simultaneously liquid money.  
     4) Commercial bank monetary seigniorage, which recognises that the power of commer-
cial banks to expand the asset side of their balance sheets, beyond that required to maintain 
a constant ratio to GDP, may lead to the appropriation of resources from the real economy.  
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     Commercial bank opportunity cost seigniorage for two countries with sovereign currencies 
and central banks, Denmark and the UK, was calculated. We found that in the UK commer-
cial bank seigniorage made up between 1% and 3% of GDP over the last quarter decade, 
whilst in Denmark the figure was lower, varying between 0.2% and 1%. We found that sei-
gniorage profits make up a significant element of banks’ profits during the period under in-
vestigation, suggesting such profits are integral to commercial banks business models. We 
noted that such seigniorage profits have been falling as interest rates have been lowered post-
the financial crisis. In an era of low or negative interest rates and high public and private 
sector to GDP debt levels, we hope the evidence presented in this paper may help inform 
policy makers as they consider how best to design and implement monetary policy and finan-
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